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SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Employment Law
I. LIQUIDATED DAMAGES CLAUSE IN PARTNERSHIP
AGREEMENT HELD NOT NONCOMPETITION COVENANT
In J. W. Hunt & Co. v. Davis' the South Carolina Court of Appeals held
that a liquidated damages clause in a partnership agreement was not a covenant
not to compete and was not subject to the reasonableness test used in
evaluating noncompetition clauses.2 In Davis the court of appeals continued
to define covenants not to compete narrowly. However, by focusing
exclusively on the classification question, the court left unresolved the more
important issue of how to treat clauses that do not fall into the category of
covenants not to compete but that produce the same effect.
J.W. Hunt and Company (J.W. Hunt), a public accounting firm in South
Carolina, operates as a general partnership. Davis became a voting partner in
1971. In 1986 the partners adopted a new partnership agreement that included
Article VII, which allows a withdrawing partner to service former clients if the
partner pays J.W. Hunt liquidated damages calculated by a preset formula.
3
In 1990 Davis resigned from J.W. Hunt and began to service several of the
partnership's clients. The partnership brought suit against Davis seeking
1. __ S.C. _, 437 S.E.2d 557 (Ct. App. 1993).
2. The reasonableness test is described in Rental Uniform Service v. Dudley, 278 S.C. 674,
301 S.E.2d 142 (1983) (per curiam). The Dudley test requires consideration of five factors. The
prohibition must be: (1) necessary for protection of the employer's legitimate interest, (2) not
unduly harsh or oppressive in curtailing the employee's legitimate efforts to earn a livelihood,
(3) reasonable from a sound public policy standpoint, (4) supported by valuable consideration,
and (5) reasonably limited as to time and place. Id. at 675-76,301 S.E.2d at 143 (citing Sermons
v. Caine & Estes Ins. Agency, 275 S.C. 506, 273 S.E.2d 338 (1980)).
3. Article VII of the J.W. Hunt partnership agreement contained the following clause:
In the event a Partner either voluntarily or involuntarily leaves the employ of the
Firm and such partner either "directly or indirectly" within a period of three (3) years
of such departure from the Firm does work for former or existing clients of the Firm,
such partner shall pay the Firm the following as liquidated damages: An amount
equal to two (2) times the annual gross billings to the client for the last full year the
client was a client of the Firm, which amount shall be paid within thirty (30) days of
written demand by the Firm. The meaning of "directly or indirectly" is that such
Partner will not render public accounting services in any of its phases, as an
individual practitioner, as a member of a partnership of which he is a partner, or as
an employee for an employer; provided, however, this provision shall not apply if
such partner is employed by a client as an employee on a full-time basis as a
treasurer, comptroller or in a similar capacity.
Davis, __ S.C. at _ n.1, 437 S.E.2d at 558 n.1.
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enforcement of Article VII. Using the set formula, the trial court determined
that Davis owed J.W. Hunt $879,068 in damages. Davis appealed.'
Affirming the trial court's decision, the court of appeals examined cases
concerning similar provisions in accounting partnership agreements to decide
whether Article VII was a covenant not to compete.5 In Dixon, Odom & Co.
v. Sledge,6 Engel v. Ernst,7 and Francis v. Schlotfeldt,8 the partners techni-
cally were free to practice their trade and to compete with their previous
partners.9 Similarly, Article VII does not prevent Davis from competing with
his former partners; he can practice his profession anywhere and can offer
accounting services to anyone, including clients of J.W. Hunt. The court
noted, "Article VII neither prohibits Davis from practicing public accounting
for any specific period of time nor from servicing any client in any specific
geographic region."1" The court decided, therefore, that Article VII was not
a covenant not to compete."
Having characterized Article VII as "nothing more than a term of an
ordinary contract," 2 the court refused to apply the reasonableness test
applied to covenants not to compete. Despite the potential burden on Davis,
the court enforced the provision as "'a [contractual] business arrangement'" 3
"'without inquiry into its fairness.'"14
The court did not address the central issue the appellant raised. The court
discussed whether Article VII was a covenant not to compete, a point that
neither party debated." According to the court, "On appeal, Davis argues
the trial judge erred in concluding Article VII is not a covenant not to
compete."' 6 This statement of the issue does not reflect the appellant's
position. Arguing "that South Carolina law requires that Article VII of the
Hunt partnership agreement be analyzed under the same rules which control
4. Id. at ,437 S.E.2d at 558.
5. Id. at __, 437 S.E.2d at 559.
6. 296 S.E.2d 512 (N.C. Ct. App. 1982).
7. 724 P.2d 215 (Nev. 1986) (per curiam).
8. 704 P.2d 281 (Kan. Ct. App. 1985).
9. See Francis, 704 P.2d at 382; Dixon, 296 S.E.2d at 515; Engel, 724 P.2d at 217.
10. J.W. Hunt & Co. v. Davis, _ S.C. , __ 437 S.E.2d 557, 559 (Ct. App. 1993).
11. Id. at __, 437 S.E.2d at 560.
12. Id. at-, 437 S.E.2d at 560.
13. Id. at , 437 S.E.2d at 560 (quoting Miller v. Williams, 300 So.2d 752, 755 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1974), cert. denied, 314 So.2d 780 (Fla. 1975)).
14. Id. at _, 437 S.E.2d at 560 (quoting Francis v. Schlotfeldt, 704 P.2d 381, 382 (Kan.
Ct. App. 1985)).
15. See generally Final Brief of Appellant and Final Brief of Respondent, in which both
parties argue as if the provision were not a covenant not to compete.
16. Davis, _ S.C. at _, 437 S.E.2d at 558.
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covenants not to compete and that the Court erred in failing to do so," 7 the
appellant indirectly conceded that Article VII is not a covenant not to compete.
By focusing on the classification of Article VII, the court of appeals
missed an excellent opportunity to affirm and clarify South Carolina's position
established by Almers v. South Carolina National Bank" on how to treat such
clauses. In Almers the South Carolina Supreme Court held that a clause that
does not specifically prohibit competition nevertheless is treated as a covenant
not to compete when the clause accomplishes the same practical result. 19 The
court's decision placed South Carolina in the minority.20
Because Almers is one of only two cases on point from South Carolina,
the scope of the rule announced therein is debatable. Almers and Wolf v.
Colonial Life & Accident Insurance Co.2 each concerned forfeiture clauses
in employment contracts.' Therefore, arguably South Carolina's rule only
covers forfeiture agreements. Furthermore, whether the contract's form is a
determinative factor is unresolved. For example, perhaps Almers should apply
only to cases involving employment contracts and not partnership agreements.
Had the Davis court applied Almers it would have found that distinctions of
form and penalty are unimportant.
Examining the reasoning of Almers and Wolf, it becomes apparent that the
rule adopted by those courts should apply equally to the present case. The
Almers case involved a forfeiture provision if the employee competed with the
employer.?3 The court held that the clause accomplished the same purpose
as a covenant not to compete and should be treated similarly, stating that
our discussion throughout this case illustrates that the covenant not to
compete and forfeiture upon competing are but alternative approaches to
accomplish the same practical result. Therefore, we would not substitute
the reasoning of the pure logician for the realities of the business world
and embark on a separate course of treatment for covenants not to compete
17. Final Brief of Appellant at 5.
18. 265 S.C. 48, 217 S.E.2d 135 (1975).
19. See id. at 59, 217 S.E.2d at 140.
20. See id. at 53-56, 217 S.E.2d at 137-38. The Almers court explained that the majority
approach does not analogize covenants not to compete to provisions accomplishing the same
result. The majority's first reason is that other penalties would not have the same immediate and
overwhelming impact as a noncompetition clause that "'might disable a former employee from
earning a living at what is perhaps the only occupation for which he is qualified.'" Id. at 55, 217
S.E.2d at 138 (quoting Couch v. Administrative Comm. of Difco Lab. Inc. Salaried Employees
Profit Sharing Trust, 205 N.W.2d 24, 26 (Mich. Ct. App. 1972)). A second justification is that
the freedom to contract would be impaired. Almers, 265 S.C. at 56, 217 S.E.2d at 138.
21. 309 S.C. 100, 420 S.E.2d 217 (Ct. App. 1992) (per curiam).
22. See Wolf, 309 S.C. at 103, 420 S.E.2d at 218-19;Almers, 265 S.C. at 50-51,217 S.E.2d
135-36.
23. See Almers, 265 S.C. at 50-51, 217 S.E.2d at 136.
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and forfeiture provisions. When pruned to their quintessence, they tend
to accomplish the same results and should be treated accordingly.'
Wolf involved an agreement that did not prohibit competition by its terms
but called for forfeiture of commissions in the event of competition. The court
ruled, "Such clauses are subject to the same requirements and strict analysis
as covenants not to compete. "I
In both cases, the courts examined the agreement's function and not its
form to determine whether to apply the reasonableness test. Similarly, in a
case like Davis, the form of the penalty merits application of the reasonable-
ness test. Whether the penalty is a forfeiture or fee percentage is inconsequen-
tial.
The three policy justifications given in Almers for following the minority
rule all support the reasonableness test's application here. First, the provision
in Almers unduly burdened the employee. As a result, "while the employee
is able to currently support himself and his family, it is likely that he or others
similarly situated may be bereaved when the time for retirement has come."16
Second, the effect of such provisions injures the general public by deterring
employees from taking competitive employment.27 Finally, the court noted
the provisions' invalidity at common law. Covenants not to compete became
the exception only when reasonable. However, when an employer cannot
prevent the employee from competing, but can only use leverage by divesting
income rights, as here, the employer attempts to avoid competition rather than
to protect legitimate business interests.2"
Since Almers, other courts have considered agreements similar to Article
VII and have ruled that the reasonableness test applied. In Peat Marwick Main
& Co. v. Haass29 the Texas Supreme Court decided a case with almost
identical facts and found the provision invalid.
In Haass two accounting firms merged pursuant to an agreement.30 The
agreement included a provision that if Haass withdrew taking clients from the
merged firm, Haass would compensate the firm by paying an amount equal to
"all fees and expenses, billed or unbilled, due to the Firm from such clients"
and "all direct costs .... paid or to be paid by the Firm in connection with
24. Id. at 59, 217 S.E.2d at 140.
25. Wolf, 309 S.C. at 106, 420 S.E.2d at 220 (citingAlmers, 265 S.C. 48, 217 S.E.2d 135).
26. Almers, 265 S.C. at 56-57, 217 S.E.2d at 139.
27. Id. at 57-58, 217 S.E.2d at 139.
28. Id., 265 S.C. at 58-59, 217 S.E.2d at 140.
29. 818 S.W.2d 381 (Tex. 1991).
30. Id. at 382.
1994]
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the acquisition of such client[s]. "3' The court held such covenants subject to
the same standards of reasonableness as covenants not to compete.32
One of the court's reasons for its holding was the nature of the breach.
Even absent a technical prohibition on competing, competition is the conduct
for which damages are assessed. The penalty's deterrent effect functions as
though the agreement stated expressly that the departing member will not
compete when the damages are sufficiently severe. The penalty inhibits
competition in virtually the same way as a covenant not to compete.33
In Philip G. Johnson & Co. v. Salmen,34 the Supreme Court of Nebras-
ka, considering another similar set of facts, reached the same result. An
accounting firm brought action for accounting and to recover damages against
a former partner. The departing partner, Salmen, withdrew from the
partnership and later accepted professional employment from the firm's former
clients. The accounting firm argued that the provision was not a covenant not
to compete because it did not prohibit Salmen from continuing in the
accounting field but obligated him to remit the fees he earned from servicing
certain clients during the three years after his withdrawal from the partner-
ship.35 The court quickly dismissed this argument, stating that "we consider
the distinction put forth by appellant to be artificial and meaningless in any
real sense. The effect of the provision, if valid, is to prevent Salmen from
earning income by competing for clients served by Johnson at any time. "36
The appellant's second argument was that the arrangement concerned not
employers and employees but partners. The Nebraska Supreme Court
explained that the court had passed previously on the question of covenants not
to compete between partners.37 More importantly, the court noted that "a
partner with such a minor interest as that held by Salmen is in a real sense no
different than an employee."" In Davis the court should have considered a
similar analysis.
Finally, the Davis court seemed to place some weight on Article VII's
"afford[ing] Davis protection against withdrawing partners from the time of
the Article's adoption until Davis' withdrawal." 39 The mutual benefit seems
to have influenced the court in its decision to enforce strictly the provision.
In Henshaw v. Kroenecke4" the Texas Supreme Court also recognized the
31. Id. at 383 n.3.
32. Id. at 385.
33. Id.
34. 317 N.W.2d 900 (Neb. 1982).
35. Id. at 902-03.
36. Id. at 903.
37. See id. (citing Adams v. Adams, 58 N.W.2d 172 (Neb. 1953)).
38. Id.
39. J.W. Hunt & Co. v. Davis, _ S.C. , ,437 S.E.2d 557, 559 (Ct. App. 1993).
40. 656 S.W.2d 416 (Tex. 1983).
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importance of mutuality of benefit. Henshaw involved the enforceability of a
covenant not to compete in a partnership agreement which provided for
liquidated damages similar to the J.W. Hunt agreement.4'
The Henshaw court explicitly rejected that only the partnership could
benefit from the agreement and that the agreement was unreasonable because
the only one of the partners, Henshaw, benefitted from the agreement.42 The
court held that Henshaw could benefit from the agreement and explained that
the other partner, Kroenecke, benefitted too: "The covenant not to compete
was an integral part of the pre-partnership formation negotiations. Henshaw
was the person for whose benefit the restraint was imposed. Kroenecke,
however, also benefitted by coming into an established business. "41
Nevertheless, the court applied a reasonableness test to the covenant. In
determining the terms' reasonableness, the court noted that "Henshaw had a
right to protect himself from the possibility that Kroenecke would establish a
rapport with the clients of the business and upon termination take a segment
of that clientele with him."' Further, the court explained that Henshaw's
having a legitimate business interest to protect made the covenant reason-
able.45
Similarly, the Davis court should have taken note of the mutual benefit
provided by Article VII. However, the court should have considered it merely
a factor in determining the provision's reasonableness.
The South Carolina Court of Appeals republished a definition of
covenants not to compete in Davis. The more interesting and useful questions
about the scope of South Carolina's rule regarding pseudo-covenants not to
compete remained uninvestigated. Future cases involving this question may
find that South Carolina courts will rely on recent cases from other jurisdic-
tions and the reasoning of South Carolina cases. If so, Almers' scope will be
expressly expanded to include all contractual provisions involving employment.
Such a holding would remain consistent with the policy underlying the Almers
case and with other cases.
Kevin R. Eberle
41. See Davis, _ S.C. at _ n.1, 437 S.E.2d at 558 n.1; Henshaw, 656 S.W.2d at 417.
42. Henshaw, 656 S.W.2d at 418.
43. Id.




South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 46, Iss. 1 [], Art. 7
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol46/iss1/7
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
II. U.S. SUPREME COURT SETS 'HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT'
STANDARD FOR SEXUAL HARASSMENT CASES
In Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson' the United States Supreme
Court held that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits hostile
work environment sexual harassment as a form of sex discrimination.3  In
determining when such a violation occurs, the lower courts took different
approaches. 4  Last Term the Court addressed what constitutes hostile work
environment sexual harassment. In Harris v. Forklift Systems,5 the Court
concluded that a plaintiff does not have to prove psychological damage or
other injury to recover under Title VII.6
In Harris the plaintiff, Theresa Harris, managed Forklift Systems, Inc.
(Forklift) from April 1985 until October 1987. Charles Hardy was Forklift's
president during this time. Hardy repeatedly insulted Harris while she worked
at Forklift. For example, he told Harris several times, "'You're a woman,
what do you know' and 'We need a man as the rental manager."' 7 On one
occasion he called he "'a dumb ass woman."'s Hardy further harassed Harris
when he "made her the target of unwanted sexual innuendos," proposed they
"'go to the Holiday Inn to negotiate [Harris'] raise,'" asked her to retrieve
coins from his front pants pocket, and asked her to pick up objects that he
threw in front of her. 9
Harris complained to Hardy about his behavior in August 1987. After
Hardy promised to stop, Harris decided to stay at Forklift.'0 However,
Hardy broke this promise. In September, when Harris was working with a
1. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1) (1988).
3. Vinson, 477 U.S. at 66.
4. Compare Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611, 620 (6th Cir. 1986) (requiring a
plaintiff to show the conduct caused some tangible injury), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987)
with Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 877-78 (9th Cir. 1991) (rejecting Rabidue's requirement).
5. __ U.S. _, 114 S. Ct. 367 (1993). Harris brought her action before the passage of the
Civil Rights Act of 1991. See id. at 369. Under the old Act, she was entitled only to equitable
relief, which included reinstatement and back pay. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1988). Under
the 1991 Act, in an intentional discrimination action under Title VII a plaintiff can recover
compensatory and punitive damages. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a) (1) (Supp. III 1991). The 1991 Act
also allows a plaintiff to have a jury trial. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(c) (Supp. III 1991). For an
overview of how the 1991 Act applies to sexual harassment cases see Marian C. Haney,
Litigation of a Sexual Harassment Case After the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 68 NoTRE DAME L.
REv. 1037 (1993).
6. Harris, - U.S. at -, 114 S. Ct. at 371.
7. Id. at__, 114 S.Ct. at 369 (quoting Petition for Cert. at A-13).
8. Id. at , 114 S.Ct. at 369 (quoting Petition for Cert. at A-13).
9. Id. at__, 114 S.Ct. at 369 (alteration in original) (quoting Petition for Cert. at A-14).
10. Id. at _, 114 S.Ct. at 369 (citing Petition for Cert. at A-16).
[Vol. 46
7
Eberle and Grimes: Employment Law
Published by Scholar Commons,
EMPLOYMENT LAW
Forklift customer, Hardy asked her "'What did you do, promise the guy..
. some [sex] Saturday night?'"" This prompted Harris to quit, and to file
suit against Forklift for sexual harassment. 
12
The district court found that Hardy's comments offended Harris and
would offend a reasonable woman. Nevertheless, the district court denied
Harris any relief, finding that Hardy's behavior did not cause Harris any
psychological or other tangible injury. Thus, the district court dismissed the
case, and the Sixth Circuit affir-med. 3
The Supreme Court relied on Title VII and its decision in Meitor,
holding that the plaintiff did not have to show that the harassment seriously
affected her psychological well-being.14 Title VII states that it is "an
unlawful employment practice for an employer.., to discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges
of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin."15
The Court rejected a requirement that plaintiffs show the harassment
seriously affected their psychological well-being because "Title VII comes into
play before the harassing conduct leads to a nervous breakdown."16 The
Court believed that an abusive work environment could cause an employee
various harms before it affected the employee psychologically. Justice
O'Connor wrote, "A discriminatorily abusive work environment... can and
often will detract from employees' job performance, discourage employees
from remaining on the job, or keep them from advancing in their careers." 17
Since Title VII's language is not confined to economic or tangible discrimina-
tion, the Court found that conduct producing these effects violates Title VII.
The Court stated further that, even if the conduct did not produce any tangible
effects, conduct creating an abusive work environment violated "Title VI's
broad rule of workplace equality."
18
In determining when a harasser's conduct violates Title VII, the Court
reaffirmed Vinson's test. The Court held that Title VII is violated "[w]hen the
workplace is permeated with 'discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult,'
that is 'sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's
employment and create an abusive working environment."19 This test has a
11. Harris, _ U.S. at _, 114 S.Ct. at 369 (quoting from Petition for Cert. at A-17)
(alteration in original).
12. Id. at__, 114 S.Ct. at 369.
13. Id. at __, 114 S.Ct. at 369-70.
14. See id. at _, 114 S.Ct. at 370-71.
15. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1) (1988).
16. Harris, __ U.S. at _, 114 S. Ct. at 370.
17. Id. at , 114 S.Ct. at 370-71.
18. Id. at _, 114 S.Ct. at 371.
19. Id. at , 114 S.Ct.. at 370 (quoting Meritor Say. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57,
1994]
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subjective and an objective prong. First, the victim must actually find the
environment hostile. If the victim is not aware of the hostility, the Court
noted that the conduct could not alter the victim's employment conditions."°
Next, the plaintiff must satisfy the objective prong of this test. The Court
concluded that offensive conduct does not violate Title VII when a reasonable
person would not find that it creates a hostile working environment.21
The Court described this test as "a middle path between making
actionable any conduct that is merely offensive and requiring the conduct to
cause a tangible psychological injury."' The court admitted that there is no
"mathematically precise test" to identify an abusive or hostile work environ-
ment.' In making this decision, the Court found that the fact finder needs
to look at the totality of the circumstances.' Relevant factors "include the
frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically
threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it
unreasonably interferes with an employee's work performance."' Although
all are relevant, "no single factor is required" or determinative.26
Then, the Court rejected Forklift's argument that the district court
correctly applied the Meitor test. Although the district court found Hardy's
conduct would not interfere with a reasonable woman manager's work
performance, the Supreme Court feared that the lower court's application of
the Rabidue test skewed its finding. Thus, the Court remanded the case for
reconsideration.27
The Court's finding that a plaintiff does not have to show severe
psychological harm is consistent with Title VII and the Court's holding in
Meitor. Title VII does not suggest that a victim of sexual harassment is
required to suffer any actual injury. In interpreting Title VII, the Court found
that its ban includes discrimination that alters one's working conditions - the
altering of working conditions is the injury.28 Requiring a plaintiff to prove
a tangible injury to recover damages is inconsistent with Title VII. Such a
at 65, 67 (1986)).
20. Id. at__, 114 S.Ct. at 370.
21. Harris, - U.S. at __, 114 S. Ct. at 370.
22. Id. at__, 114 S.Ct. at 370.
23. Id. at__, 114 S.Ct. at 371.
24. Id. at __,-114 S.Ct. at 371; see also 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(b) (1993) (stating that the
EEOC will look at the totality of the circumstances to determine if alleged behavior is sexual
harassment).
25. Harris, _ U.S. at __, 114 S. Ct. at 371.
26. Id. at __, 114 S.Ct. at 371.
27. Id. at __, 114 S.Ct. at 370-71.
28. Meritor Say. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U. S. 57, 67 (1986) (quoting Henson v. City of
Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (11th Cir. 1982)).
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standard requires a higher level of harassing conduct than otherwise would be
required to show an alteration of the plaintiff's working conditions.
This new standard seems to create a broader remedy than previously
available. The Court indicated that a hostile environment is created when
severe or pervasive discriminatory conduct exists, even if this conduct does not
interfere with the plaintiff s work performance.29 The Court's use of "severe
or pervasive" shows that the plaintiff's work environment must do more than
merely differ from the other employees' work environments before courts will
find a violation of Title VII. Although Justices Scalia and Ginsburg would like
to focus more on whether the conduct unreasonably interfered with the
plaintiff's work performance, they would find a violation of Title VII when
"the harassment so altered working conditions as to 'ma[k]e it more difficult
to do the job.'" 30
Even though this standard will further the goal of workplace equality, it
still allows a certain level of harassment. Because the test only outlaws
conduct that a reasonable person would find hostile, it allows for a "reason-
able" level of harassment.31
In trying to determine what an unreasonable level of harassment is, the
Court did not fashion a per se rule. This uncertainty produces another benefit.
Because no certain guidelines exist, employers may take more preventive steps
to reduce potential liability. Thus, one may argue these precautionary steps
would implement the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's advice
that prevention is the best policy.32
While the Court took this opportunity to clarify the standards for proving
a hostile work environment, it left unanswered from whose perspective the fact
finder should determine whether the conduct establishes a hostile work
environment. Should courts use the standard of a reasonable person or of a
reasonable woman? Even though the Court indicated that the fact finder
should use a reasonable person standard,33 a recent Seventh Circuit case
shows this question is unresolved.3" The proponents of the reasonable
29. See Harris, __ U.S. at __, 114 S. Ct. at 371.
30. Id. at __, 114 S.Ct. at 372 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (alteration in original) (quoting
Davis v. Monsanto Chem. Co., 858 F.2d 345, 349 (6th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1110
(1989)).
31. See Wendy Pollack, Sexual Harassment: Women's Experience vs. Legal Definitions, 13
HARv. WoMEN's L.J. 35, 48 (1990) (arguing that any interference is unreasonable).
32. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.1 1(f) (1993); cf. Robert S. Adler & Ellen R. Peirce, The Legal,
Ethical, and Social Implications of the "Reasonable Woman" Standard in Sexual Harassment
Cases, 61 FORDHAM L. REv. 773, 818-19 (1993) (discussing how employers' overreaction may
bar legitimate conduct); Kingsley R. Browne, Title VII as Censorship: Hostile-Environment
Harassment and the First Amendment, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 481, 483 (1991) (discussing how
employers overregulate their employees' speech).
33. See Harris, __ U.S. at __, 114 S. Ct. at 370.
34. See Saxton v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 10 F.3d 526, 534 n.13 (7th Cir. 1993) (citing
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woman standard argue that the reasonable person test does not give enough
weight to women's views of sexual harassment. First, they argue the
"reasonable person standard tends to be male-biased."3" Second, courts and
commentators point out that women may view as offensive conduct that men
may consider harmless.36 As one commentator stated, the reasonable person
standard "is a stark denial of a range of social facts that make sexual
harassment a distinctly different experience for women than it would be for
men."37  Because men control most workplaces, women may interpret
harassing conduct as a statement of a woman's lack of ability to succeed.3"
Furthermore, women's view of sex also gives them a different perspective
when faced with sexual harassment.39 Thus, a reasonable woman standard
will serve to highlight a woman's perspective of sexual harassment.
Despite these advantages, the reasonable woman standard has not escaped
criticism.' First, even if courts do adopt this test, it does not guarantee
women greater protection. In Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co. ,' the district
court applied the reasonable woman standard, but did not find a hostile work
environment.42 Thus, the problem may not come from the test but from the
perspective of those applying it.43 However, with the passage of the 1991
Bums v. McGregor Elec. Indus,, 989 F.2d 959 (9th Cir. 1993); Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872
(9th Cir. 1991)); see also Currie v. Kowalewski, 842 F. Supp. 57 (N.D.N.Y. 1994) (stating that
Harris did not decide whether the reasonable person standard or the reasonable woman standard
applies).
35. Ellison, 924 F.2d at 879; see Naomi R. Cahn, The Looseness of Legal Language: The
Reasonable Woman Standard in Theory and in Practice, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1398, 1405
(1992).
36. Ellison, 924 F.2d at 878 (citing Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881 (1st
Cir. 1988); Yates v. Avco Corp., 819 F.2d 630 (6th Cir. 1987); Kathryn Abrams, Gender
Discrimination and the Transformation of Workplace Norms, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1183 (1989);
Nancy S. Ehrenreich, Pluralist Myths and Powerless Men: The Ideology of Reasonableness in
Sexual Harassment Law, 99 YALE L. J. 1177 (1990); Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d
1469, 1486 (3d Cir. 1990); see also Jolyrn Childers, Comment, Is There a Place for a
Reasonable Woman in the Law? A Discussion of Recent Developments in Hostile Environment
Sexual Harassment, 42 DUKE L. J. 854, 884-85 (1993) (supporting the reasonable woman
standard because men and women frequently view sexual conduct differently).
37. Ehrenreich, supra note 36, at 1202.
38. Id. at 1203-05.
39. Id. at 1205.
40. Radtke v. Everett, 501 N.W.2d 155, 165-67 (Mich. 1993) (rejecting the reasonable
woman standard under Michigan's Civil Rights Act); see generally Adler & Peirce, supra note
32, at 818-27; Childers, supra note 36, at 888-902.
41. 584 F. Supp. 419 (E.D. Mich. 1984), aff'd, 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied,
481 U.S. 1041 (1987).
42. Id. at 433.
43. See Cahn, supra note 35, at 1433; Childers, supra note 36, at 901.
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Civil Rights Act, which allows plaintiffs to have a jury trial,44 women will
not have to worry as much about white, middle-class, male judges45 deter-
mining how a reasonable woman would view the conduct. Even though white,
middle-class males will serve as jurors, their fellow female jurors can make
them aware of women's different perspectives of sexual harassment.
Second, the adoption of the reasonable woman standard may perpetuate
the differences between men and women rather than allowing each group to
understand the other's views. 46 This standard seems to assume men do not
have the capacity to understand women's perspective of sexual harassment.47
Because the differences between men and women's views arise through
socialization, it follows logically that a different form of socialization can
either weaken or eliminate these differences. 4' As more women enter and
obtain higher positions in the workplace, these perception problems likely will
be reduced.49
Although the reasonable woman standard has some advantages over the
reasonable person standard, these advantages do not outweigh its drawbacks.
Instead of making the victim's gender controlling, the courts should use gender
as one factor in determining if the harasser's conduct creates a hostile
environment.
Another unanswered question is whether an expansive definition of a
hostile work environment will violate the First Amendment because such a
defimition would regulate speech based on its content. In characterizing the
First Amendment, the Court has stated, "If there is a bedrock principle
underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit
the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive
or disagreeable. "0 As the claims of hostile environment based on extreme
conduct subside and claims based on verbal or other expressive conduct
increase, it remains unclear how the courts will address the First Amendment
aspects of these cases.
A broad definition of a hostile work environment would raise several First
Amendment problems."' Although many people assume "that there is no
44. See supra note 5.
45. See Cahn, supra note 35, at 1433.
46. Childers, supra note 36, at 895; cf. Radtke v. Everett, 501 N.W.2d 155, 165 (Mich.
1993) (rejecting a gender-conscious standard).
47. See Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 884 (9th Cir. 1991) (Stephens, J., dissenting).
48. Childers, supra note 36, at 895.
49. Id. at 897.
50. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) (citations omitted).
51. Although the First Amendment addresses government action, no state action problem
exists because the government's imposition of civil liability for speech is as much a state action
as a direct regulation would be. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265
(1964); see also Browne, supra note 32, at 511-12 (arguing that no state action problem exists).
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general right of free speech in the workplace,"" this assumption does not
appear correct.53 One problem lies in defining what constitutes a hostile
work environment. Even though there is a need for a clear definition, Harris
shows that it is unlikely that one will soon emerge. Because the current
definition does not give one reasonably clear notice of what speech is
allowable, the vagueness doctrine may invalidate the regulation.5
Second, a substantial risk exists that the employers' overregulation will
chill the employees' speech. 55 Because courts hold employers liable for any
violations and because employers will incur attorneys' fees even when courts
do not find them liable, employers may suppress anything resembling
impermissible speech.56 Although speech advocating unpopular or offensive
political views 7 could create a hostile work environment, the First Amend-
ment may not allow its suppression. Regulation of speech falling between the
advocation of unpopular political views and the recognized exceptions to the
First Amendment could raise overbreadth problems. It is likely that the
employer will regulate some protected speech to avoid liability. Robinson v.
Jacksonville Shipyards58 highlighted this overbreadth problem. In Robinson
the court issued an injunction banning "sexually suggestive" pictures plus
other materials. 59 However, its definition of sexually suggestive is overbroad
and could conceivably include the works of Michelangelo and other artists.
6
0
Despite these potential problems, courts have not found any First
Amendment problems with Title VII. 61 In R.A. V. v. City of St. Paul" the
Supreme Court indicated that Title VII hostile environment claims would
survive a First Amendment challenge. Justice Scalia discussed two possible
arguments that would justify these regulations. First, he stated that a "valid
52. Browne, supra note 32, at 513.
53. See id. at 513-16.
54. See id. at 502.
55. Although the First Amendment does not prohibit a private employer from imposing
regulations on speech, one should be concerned when the regulations are motivated by the fear
of civil liability.
56. See Browne, supra note 32, at 504-05; see also Eugene Volokh, Comment, Freedom of
Speech and Workplace Harassment, 39 UCLA L. REv. 1791, 1812-13 (1992) (discussing why
employers would overregulate their employees' speech).
57. See Volokh, supra note 56, at 1802-03.
58. 760 F. Supp. 1486 (M.D. Fla. 1991). Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc. has appealed this
decision, but the Eleventh Circuit has not yet decided this case.
59. See id. at 1538.
60. Michael E. Collins, Comment, Pin-Ups in the Workplace--Balancing Title VII Mandates
With the Right of Free Speech, 23 CUMB. L. REv. 629, 649, 649 n.126 (1993).
61. See Robinson, 760 F. Supp. at 1534-36; Doe v. University of Michigan, 721 F. Supp.
852, 863 (E.D. Mich. 1989). One reason for this finding is that defendants have not raised the
First Amendment as a defense in most cases. Browne, supra note 33, at 512.
62. _ U.S. _, 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992).
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basis for according differential treatment to even a content-defined subclass of
proscribable speech is that the subclass happens to be associated with
particular 'secondary effects' of the speech, so that the regulation is 'justified
without reference to the content of the . . . speech.' "6 Second, he wrote
that laws aimed at conduct can incidentally regulate a "content-based
subcategory of a proscribable class of speech," such as "sexually derogatory
'fighting words.'"' Justice Scalia cited Title VII as an example of such a
law because it is directed against sexual discrimination in employment.'
Justice Scalia seemed to indicate that the secondary effects exception
would not be a valid basis for these regulations. He wrote that "[l]isteners'
reactions to speech are not the type of 'secondary effects'" that justify
restrictions on speech.66 Nonetheless, these reactions are exactly what Title
VII, as now applied, protects against. While plaintiffs may argue that Title
VII protects their work performance, their reaction to the speech creates the
alteration in their working conditions or the deterioration in their performance.
If the employee does not react to the speech in this manner, then no violation
of Title VII exists.67 Thus, the plaintiff's reaction to the speech is integral
to the finding of a Title VII violation.
Justice Scalia's second exception provides a basis for applying Title VII
to harassing speech. This exception is unlikely to be broadly construed
because it merely covers "sexually derogatory 'fighting words.'"6 Thus,
this exception appears to have a potentially significant limitation because it is
unlikely that a court would consider subtler forms of verbal harassment as
fighting words, obscenity, or libel.69
Another justification for these regulations is that employees are a captive
audience. One commentator has argued that when a harasser directs his
speech at a woman where she cannot move out of hearing range, she may be
captive because she cannot readily avoid the harassment.7' However, this
63. Id. at __, 112 S.Ct. at 2546 (alteration in original) (quoting City of Renton v. Playtime
Theatres, 475 U.S. 41, 48 (1986)).
64. Id. at __, 112 S. Ct. at 2546 (citations omitted).
65. See id. at _, 112 S.Ct. at 2546-47.
66. Id. at __, 112 S.Ct. at 2549 (plurality opinion) (alteration in original) (quoting Boos v.
Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988).
67. Even if a plaintiff finds that the comments create a hostile environment, Title VII is not
violated if a reasonable person (or woman) would not be offended. This fact does not detract
from the First Amendment problem because a violation of Title VII depends upon a plaintiff
being subjectively offended. See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
68. R.A.V., __ U.S. at __, 112 S.Ct. at 2546. Justice Scalia also indicated that this
exception covers other categories of speech. See id. at 2546-47. These other exceptions are
likely to be other prescribable categories of speech, such as obscenity and libel.
69. See Volokh, supra note 56, at 1830 (noting that courts would be dealing with a content-
defined subclass of protected speech because not all harassing speech is a proscribable class of
speech).
70. See Marcy Strauss, Sexist Speech in the Workplace, 25 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rv. 1, 36-
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doctrine would not seem to support these restrictions on speech for two
reasons. First, the Court has not recognized employees as captive audienc-
es. 71 Second, the ban on this speech is underinclusive because it only bans
speech expressing certain offensive viewpoints.72
In conclusion, it appears that courts and the bar should not take for
granted the inapplicability of the First Amendment to Title VII hostile
environment claims. As plaintiffs push the limits of what constitutes a hostile
environment, the First Amendment likely will provide a defense to claims
predominantly based on offensive speech or expressive conduct. The lowering
of the threshhold in Harris of what effect harassment must have to qualify as




71. See Browne, supra note 32, at 516. But see NLRB v. United Steelworkers of Am., 357
U.S. 357, 368 (1958) ("Employees during working hours are the classic captive audience.")
(Warren, C.J., dissenting in part and concurring in part); Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards,
760 F. Supp. 1486, 1535-36 (M.D. Fla. 1991).
72. Browne, supra note 32, at 518.
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